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Abstract: According	 to	 econometric	 estimations	 using	 firm	 balance	 sheets	 of	 the	publicly	listed	companies	in	the	UK,	in	large	non-financial	corporations	(NFCs),	investment	rate	would	have	been	16%	higher	without	the	rise	in	financial	payments,	and	41%	higher	without	 the	 increasing	 financial	 incomes,	 and	 in	 the	 small	NFCs,	 investment	would	 have	been	35%	higher	without	the	rise	in	financial	incomes.	
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Productivity puzzle? Financialization, inequality, investment 
 Productivity	 in	 Britain	 is	 lower	 than	 other	 developed	 countries,	 and	 the	 Great	Recession	has	made	this	dismal	performance	even	worse.	This	is	not	at	all	a	puzzle	given	the	investment	and	growth	pattern	in	Britain.	Among	developed	countries,	Britain	also	has	one	 of	 the	 lowest	 private	 investment	 rates	 as	 a	 ratio	 to	 GDP.	 At	 the	 core	 of	 this	development	 lies	 the	missing	 link	 between	profits	 and	 investment.	 Rising	 inequality	 and	financialization	have	been	the	main	reasons	behind	this	missing	link	and	hence	the	major	brakes	on	investment,	growth,	and	productivity.				Productivity	 is	 defined	 as	 output	 per	 employee	 and	 has	 two	 components:	 one	 is	simply	 related	 to	 demand,	 as	 actual	 output	 is	 demand	 driven.	 The	 second	 component	 is	about	 potential	 productivity,	which	 is	 determined	 by	 technological	 progress,	which	 is	 in	turn	affected	by	both	investment	and	wage	costs.		Private	 investment	 responds	 to	 demand	 and	 public	 infrastructure	 and	 not	 just	 to	profitability.	Britain’s	 reliance	on	 low	wages	not	 only	 leads	 to	 lower	demand	and	 affects	investment	through	the	demand	channel,	but	also	makes	firms	reluctant	to	invest	due	to	a	tendency	to	exploit	low	labour	costs.		Despite	 increasing	 profits,	 private	 investment	 has	 been	weak	 in	 Britain	 since	 the	1980s,	 as	 firms	 directed	 their	 profits	 to	 financial	 speculation.	 According	 to	 our	 recent	research	at	the	Greenwich	Political	Economy	Research	Centre	on	the	investment	behaviour	of	non-financial	corporations	(NFCs)	 in	Britain,	not	only	high	dividend	payments	but	also	increasing	 financial	 revenues	 of	 firms	 due	 to	 their	 surging	 financial	 activities	 crowd	 out	private	 investment	 in	physical	machinery	and	equipment	(Tori	and	Onaran,	2015;	2017).	Perversely,	 financial	 activities	 do	 not	 provide	 more	 funds	 for	 productive	 activity,	 in	particular	 in	 the	 case	 of	 large	 companies	 as	 firms	 direct	 their	 profits	 to	 financial	speculation.			Figure	 1	 shows	 the	 ratio	 of	 investment	 (addition	 to	 fixed	 assets)	 to	 operating	income;	 i.e.	 the	 rate	 of	 reinvestment,	 and	 the	 stock	 of	 financial	 assets	 as	 a	 ratio	 to	 fixed	assets.	There	has	been	a	clear	decline	of	the	operating	income	devoted	to	the	enlargement	of	NFCs’	core	activities	from	80-90%	in	the	1980s	to	40-50%	in	the	last	decade.	Despite	the	partial	recovery	of	investments	since	1992,	the	rate	of	reinvestment	continued	to	decline.	In	sharp	contrast,	 the	stock	of	 financial	assets	 increased	substantially,	 reaching	90%	as	a	ratio	to	 fixed	capital	 in	 the	 late	1980s,	and	a	 level	more	than	three	times	the	 fixed	assets	before	the	crisis	in	2008.	The	financial	crisis	in	2008	has	led	to	only	a	slight	fall	in	the	value	of	the	financial	assets.	In	 the	 UK	 (figure	 2),	 the	 rate	 of	 accumulation	 (investment/capital	 stock)	 has	remained	 stagnant	 around	 an	 average	 of	 25%	 for	 the	 whole	 period,	 and	 the	 reinvested	profits	 declined.	 	 In	 sharp	 contrast,	 the	 stock	 of	 financial	 assets	 increased	 substantially,	reaching	 3.6	 times	 higher	 than	 fixed	 assets	 in	 2015.	 This	 substantial	 involvement	 in	 the	accumulation	of	financial	assets	resulted	in	increasing	non-operating	income	for	the	NFCs	until	the	2007-2008	crisis.	Financial	payments	of	the	NFCs	in	the	form	of	interests	on	debt	and	dividends	paid	 to	 the	shareholders	also	 increased	substantially	 since	 the	mid-1990s,	partially	recovering	from	a	decline	during	the	crisis	period.	According	to	our	econometric	estimations	using	firm	balance	sheets	of	the	publicly	listed	 companies	 in	 the	UK,	 in	 large	NFCs,	 investment	 rate	would	have	been	16%	higher	without	the	rise	in	interest	and	dividend	payments,	and	41%	higher	without	the	increasing	
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financial	incomes,	and	in	the	small	NFCs,	investment	would	have	been	35%	higher	without	the	rise	in	financial	incomes	(Tori	and	Onaran,	2017).	
The physical accumulation in manufacturing sector suffered even more experiencing a 
finance-led deindustrialisation. In particular, for the pre-crisis period in manufacturing we find 
that the adverse effects of financial payments and financial incomes almost entirely offset the 
positive impacts due to increasing sales and retained profits (Tori and Onaran, 2015).  Financialization	 and	 its	 effect	 on	 corporate	 strategies	 have	 also	 had	 detrimental	effects	on	the	bargaining	power	of	 labour	and	 inequality	(Guschanski	and	Onaran,	2016).	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	orientation	 towards	 shareholder	 value	 increased	 the	dominance	of	shareholders’	demands	over	workers’	demands.	On	the	other	hand,	increased	domestic	and	global	 financial	 investment	 opportunities	 increased	 the	 fall-back	 options	 of	 non-financial	firms	both	in	terms	of	geographic	 location	as	well	as	financial	assets,	putting	pressure	on	irreversible,	domestic	real	investment	in	physical	machinery	and	capital.		Financialization	and	increased	fall	back	options	of	capital,	in	particular	with	respect	to	tax	competition	between	different	jurisdictions,	has	also	had	effects	on	the	composition	of	 public	 spending	 and	 taxation	 (Onaran	 and	 Boesch,	 2014),	 which	 in	 turn	 has	 further	contributed	to	the	decline	in	the	bargaining	power	of	labour	as	well	as	public	infrastructure	and	productivity.			These	 developments	went	 along	with	 further	 institutional	 and	 structural	 changes	that	led	to	a	significant	fall	in	trade	union	density	and	collective	bargaining	coverage.	As	a	result,	 in	 the	 last	 three	and	a	half	decades,	 inequality	has	 increased	substantially	and	the	share	of	national	income	that	goes	to	wages	has	fallen	dramatically.		The	share	of	wages	in	UK	GDP	fell	from	its	peak	of	76.2%	in	1975	to	67.7%	in	2007,	and	after	the	Great	Recession	further	to	65.8%	in	2015.			Wage	stagnation	has	fuelled	increasing	profits	as	a	share	of	GDP,	but	this	has	led	to	bleak	prospects	in	terms	of	demand,	and	this	in	turn	discourages	investment	despite	high	profitability.	While	this	is	a	puzzle	from	a	neoclassical	point	of	view,	it	is	not	unexpected	for	Post-Keynesian/Kaleckian	economics,	which	highlight	the	dual	role	of	wages	as	both	a	cost	item	 and	 source	 of	 demand.	 Our	 findings	 show	 that	 a	 lower	 share	 of	 wages	 in	 national	income	leads	to	a	lower	GDP	in	Britain	as	well	as	most	large	countries	(Onaran	and	Obst,	2016;	Onaran	and	Galanis,	2014;	Obst,	Onaran,	Nikolaidi,	2017).			Hence	 the	 demand	 regime	 is	 "wage-led".	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 a	 pro-capital	redistribution	of	income	leads	to	lower	domestic	consumption	demand.	On	the	other	hand,	the	stimulus	to	private	investment	due	to	higher	profits	remains	weak	(or	even	absent)	and	at	 the	 same	 time	private	 investment	 responds	very	negatively	 to	 the	 fall	 in	demand.	Our	results	show	that	despite	 increasing	profit	share	 in	GDP,	private	 investment	decreased	in	Britain	due	 to	 the	 substantially	negative	 impact	of	 the	 fall	 in	 the	wage	 share	on	demand	(Onaran	 and	 Obst,	 2016;	 Obst,	 Onaran,	 Nikolaidi,	 2017).	 Firms	 directing	 their	 profits	 to	financial	speculation	in	the	absence	of	a	healthy	growth	in	demand	is	as	much	a	result	of	this	process	as	it	is	a	contributor	to	the	lack	of	demand.		The	much	celebrated	impact	of	wage	stagnation	on	external	demand,	i.e.	higher	net	exports,	 is	 rather	 weak	 in	 Britain,	 and	 the	 impact	 is	 diminished	 substantially	 when	 all	countries	 implement	 the	 same	 international	 competiveness	 policies	 based	 on	 labour	market	 flexibility	and	a	 race	 to	 the	bottom	on	wages	 (Onaran	and	Galanis,	2014;	Onaran	and	Obst,	 2015).	 This	 leaves	Britain	with	 the	 net	 negative	 impact	 of	 rising	 inequality	 on	domestic	 demand.	 	 This	 explains	 why	 Britain’s	 export	 performance	 is	 so	 weak	 despite	
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falling	labour	costs:	 international	competitiveness	is	more	about	productivity	than	labour	costs,	 particularly	 in	 a	 world	 in	 which	 a	 race	 to	 the	 bottom	 in	 labour	 costs	 has	 been	normalised.			In	the	aftermath	of	the	Great	Recession,	the	lack	of	a	full	recovery	in	wage	income	continues	 to	 be	 a	 drag	 on	household	 confidence	 and	demand,	which	 in	 turn	discourages	business	 investment	 in	 the	absence	of	a	healthy	growth	 in	domestic	demand.	 In	 the	past,	the	UK	relied	on	household	debt	to	maintain	consumption	levels	in	the	absence	of	growth	in	wages.	After	the	crisis,	recovery	is	still	based	on	the	same	shaky	grounds	as	it	is	driven	by	a	massive	increase	in	private	household	debt	and	will	remain	fragile	to	any	increase	in	interest	rates	in	the	future.	The	rise	in	inequality	and	stagnation	in	wages	has	been	one	of	the	fundamental	flaws	in	the	neoliberal	economic	model,	which	has	been	at	the	root	of	the	Great	Recession,	and	we	are	far	from	correcting	this	imbalance.			Overall,	 the	 mixture	 of	 financialization	 and	 rising	 inequality	 has	 created	 an	increasingly	 more	 fragile	 mode	 of	 production	 with	 volatile	 and	 stagnant	 demand	 and	investment.	In	the	absence	of	strong	investment	performance	and	stagnant	demand,	it	is	no	wonder	that	Britain	is	in	a	phase	of	low	productivity	and	low	potential	growth.	A	process	of	de-financialization	of	 the	non-financial	 sector	 is	a	pre-condition	 for	a	stable	and	vigorous	investment	performance.	This	would	require	an	extended	regulation	of	companies’	non-operating	financial	activities	along	with	financial	regulation.			Managers’	 short	 termist	behaviour	 and	decisions	 exclusively	 aimed	at	maximizing	dividends	distributed	to	the	shareholders	should	be	disincentivized.	What	is	needed	is	the	provision	of	an	 institutional	setting	 for	 the	NFCs	that	encourage	management	orientation	towards	 long	 term	 growth	 and,	 more	 generally,	 ‘stakeholder	 value’.	 This	 should	 be	addressed	in	particular	in	the	case	of	larger	corporations.		The	 focus	of	 corporate	governance	 should	be	on	 the	destination	of	 the	 funds.	The	corporation	 today	 is	 an	 institution	 composed	 of	 different	 layers	 of	 productive	 and	 non-operating	 activities.	 Policies	 should	 aim	 at	 favouring	 a	 productive	 destination	 of	 NFCs’	internal	funds,	e.g.	higher	rate	of	taxation	on	profits	which	are	not	invested.		The	 empirical	 evidence	 regarding	 the	 vicious	 circle	 of	 financialization	 -	 rising	inequality,	 sluggish	 accumulation	 and	 productivity	 -	 hints	 at	 the	 need	 for	 a	 coordinated	policy	mix	of	alternative	progressive	labour	market	policies	targeting	the	top,	middle,	and	bottom	 of	 the	 wage	 distribution	 to	 reverse	 inequality	 embedded	 in	 a	 broader	macroeconomic	 and	 industrial	 policy,	 financial	 regulation	 and	 corporate	 governance	framework	(Onaran,	2015).	Only	then	will	investment	and	productivity	follow.			 	
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Figure 1. Investment/Operating income (I/π), and financial assets/fixed assets (FA/K) in 
NFCs, the UK    	
		
Source:	Tori	and	Onaran	(2015)	based	on	Worldscope	data		
Figure 2 Investment/Fixed Assets (I/K), total financial payments/fixed assets (F/K), and 
total financial profits/fixed assets (πF/K, RHA), NFCs in the UK.  
	
Source:	Tori	and	Onaran	(2017)	based	on	Worldscope	data	
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